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Spoliation of Evidence 
PROPOSALS FOR NEW YORK STATE* 
  
The destruction of evidence, commonly known as 
spoliation, has become an increasing problem in civil litigation 
today.1 Commentators have noted that “we live in an era of 
spoliation”2 and that “deliberate obstructionism is 
commonplace.”3 One study indicates that approximately one-
half of litigators consider spoliation a frequent or regular 
occurrence.4 Another study points to actual incentives to alter 
evidence pending trial.5 Spoliation has also been at the center 
of recent, well-publicized criminal cases involving Martha 
Stewart6 and Arthur Andersen.7 While the manner of 
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 1 MARGARET M. KOESEL, DAVID A. BELL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION 
OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION xi (2000) (characterizing spoliation as an “unfortunate reality of modern-
day civil litigation”). 
 2 Gregory P. Joseph, Rule Traps, LITIG. A.B.A, Vol. 30, No.1, at 9 (Fall 2003) 
(noting that “parties long not so much for documentary evidence as for evidence that 
documents have been destroyed”). 
 3 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial 
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of 
the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 793, 794 (1993). 
 4 Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards the 
Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (1993). 
 5 Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The 
Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 795 (1991) (claiming that 
much incentive to spoliate exists because spoliation is unlikely to be discovered).  
1045 
 6 Martha Stewart was found guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of justice and 
two counts of making false statements over the sale of 4,000 shares of ImClone 
Systems stock. See Martha Stewart Found Guilty on all Counts, March 6, 2004, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/05/ stewart.main/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005). The obstruction charge included the “altering of evidence” involving allegedly 
altered phone logs and notes to which Ms. Stewart had access. See Constance L. Hays, 
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spoliation—from deleting e-mails to shredding documents—
may differ, its effect on the underlying case is the same: loss of 
evidence prevents a party from adequately proving or 
defending a claim at trial.8 Furthermore, destruction of 
evidence violates the spirit of liberal discovery, offends notions 
of fair play, and generally undermines the efficacy of the 
adversarial system.9  
In response to spoliation, courts have developed an 
array of remedies against the spoliator including sanctions, 
adverse inference instructions, criminal penalties and even a 
separate tort of spoliation.10 However, the use of such remedies 
varies widely across jurisdictions,11 causing a variety of 
problems as courts fail to agree on choice-of-law principles 
when spoliation issues emerge.12  
Two particular problems have developed with the New 
York courts’ approach to remedying spoliation. First, New York 
courts employ the remedy of the adverse inference instruction 
with little, if any, regard to its potentially drastic effects. The 
instruction, which asks a jury to view the destroyed evidence as 
inherently adverse to the spoliator’s case, is apt to produce 
unduly harsh consequences, especially when the spoliator is 
  
Prosecutor Says Martha Stewart Spun Web of Lies About Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2004, at C1. 
 7 The accounting firm Arthur Andersen, LLP was convicted for criminal 
obstruction of justice under the United States Code (U.S.C.). Andersen was found 
guilty of destroying accounting documents (paper and electronic) pertaining to its 
troubled client, the Enron Corporation. At the time the documents were destroyed, 
Andersen was aware that the Securities and Exchange Commission was investigating 
Enron. See generally John Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention 
Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721 
(2003). 
 8 See Spencer, supra note 4, at 38. 
 9 Randi D. Bandman & Jay M. Du Nesme, Recent Developments in the Area 
of Spoliation of Evidence, SCO1 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 463, 465 (July 
1997) (describing how “destruction of evidence undermines the integrity of the legal 
system, a system that was designed to promote a society that expects that its citizens 
will take responsibility for and own up to their actions.”). 
 10 Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver, Demystifying Spoliation of 
Evidence, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 774-75 (1999). See discussion infra Part III. 
 11 David A. Bell, Margaret M. Koesel & Tracey L. Turnbull, Let’s Level the 
Playing Field: A New Proposal for Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 791 (1997) (“Thus far, judicial treatment of spoliation claims 
arising in the context of pending litigation has been inconsistent.”). 
 12 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 193-94 
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“This area of the law 
appears to be in the process of rather rapid change, although the patterns of the new 
order are not yet entirely clear.”). 
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merely negligent.13 For example, a jury may find against a 
spoliator merely because he altered evidence and not because 
he was liable in the underlying suit. A Southern District of 
New York court noted that the “adverse inference instruction 
often ends litigation—it is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator 
to overcome.”14 Until New York state courts recognize this 
hurdle, they risk unjustly penalizing spoliation parties.  
Second, New York does not recognize a separate tort for 
spoliation by first parties15 and has recognized the tort by third 
parties in only a handful of cases.16 In defense of this position, 
the state courts believe that the traditional remedies are 
adequate in addressing the destruction of evidence.17 While this 
may hold true for first-party spoliation, it does not for third-
party spoliation. Because third-party spoliators are not 
recognized by the court as parties to a lawsuit, they are beyond 
  
 13 See Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. Weiner, Digital Dangers: A Primer on 
Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74 PA. B.A.Q. 1, 7 (Jan. 2003) (listing “severe 
sanctions, such as adverse inference instructions” imposed by courts when “relevant 
electronic evidence was not preserved, or was intentionally destroyed”). 
 14 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(remarking that the adverse inference instruction has an “in terrorem” effect and is an 
extreme sanction and should not be given lightly). 
 15 Spoliation by an opposing party to an actual or potential lawsuit is known 
as “first-party” spoliation, while spoliation by a nonparty, (i.e., stranger to the lawsuit) 
is referred to as “third-party” spoliation. See generally Fairclough v. Hugo, 616 
N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1994) (refusing to recognize an independent cause of action for 
first-party spoliation where plaintiffs failed to establish that the alleged failure to 
preserve evidence would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs to 
establish their claim for malpractice); Pharr v. Cortese, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (Sup. Ct. 
1990) (declining to create a first-party spoliation tort in medical malpractice case 
unless duty to preserve evidence exists).  
   16 Most such cases are limited to instances where an employee sues his 
employer for spoliation of evidence and resulting impairment of the employee's claim 
against a third-party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Ripepe v. Crown Equip. Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 
64 (App. Div. 2002); Curran v. Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 721 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div 2001); 
DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, 682 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 1998); Vaughn 
v. City of New York, 607 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1994). But see Weigl v. Quincy 
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div. 1993) (declining to recognize a tort of 
third-party spoliation where university discarded lab coat in student’s suit against coat 
manufacturer). See also discussion of Modified Recognition of Third-Party Spoliation 
infra Part IV.C.   
 17 See, e.g., Simet v. Coleman Co., Inc. 778 N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Div. 2004) 
(rejecting cause of action for spoliation while noting that court has discretion to impose 
sanctions for the destruction of evidence); Metlife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, 
Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 282 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to recognize a cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence and, instead, relying on “the comparative advantages of 
remedying any injury through the imposition of carefully chosen and specifically 
tailored sanctions within the context of the underlying action.”); Pharr, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 
782 (noting that the traditional sanctions imposed on spolitors are adequate in 
remedying victims of spoliation); Weigl, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 775. 
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the reach of typical remedies available to such parties.18 New 
York courts are thus unable to sanction third parties.19 In spite 
of these policies, or perhaps because of them, many plaintiffs 
continue to bring claims asking New York courts to recognize a 
separate cause of action for spoliation. With few exceptions, 
however, the courts continually refuse to recognize such a tort,20 
and consequently New York risks allowing such parties to go 
unpenalized when they destroy evidence. 
Part I of this Note examines the basic elements of 
spoliation and discusses when the duty to preserve evidence 
arises and how courts determine whether spoliated evidence is 
relevant to issues at trial. Part II considers the traditional 
remedies employed against spoliation and their respective 
shortcomings. This part will give special attention to the 
adverse inference instruction, which is the most commonly 
used remedy and indeed the most controversial, especially in 
view of its potentially drastic effects on the litigating parties. 
Part III chronicles the development of the spoliation tort and 
analyzes the advantages and inherent problems in recognizing 
it. Part IV surveys the status of the treatment of spoliation in 
the New York court system, focusing on the state’s use of the 
adverse inference instruction as well as its refusal to adopt the 
separate tort of spoliation. Finally, in light of emerging trends 
in combating spoliation, Part V suggests that New York should 
utilize the adverse inference instruction more cautiously and 
recognize a separate tort for third-party spoliation. 
I. ELEMENTS OF SPOLIATION  
Spoliation is “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence . . 
. or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or 
  
 18 See Jonathan Judge, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives 
to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442. See also Elias v. Lancaster Gen 
Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that “traditional remedies would 
be unavailing, since the spoliator is not a party to the underlying litigation.”). 
 19 MetLife Auto & Home, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to 
recognize a duty to preserve evidence as a basis for imposing tort liability for a 
negligent or reckless act of spoliation committed by a third party to the underlying 
claim where third party made voluntary promise and undertaking to do so). See infra 
note 225 and accompanying text. 
 20 See, e.g., Fairclough v. Hugo, 616, N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1994) (referring 
to the Pharr decision, rejecting on the facts an independent claim for intentional 
spoliation of evidence by a third party (other than by an employer)); Steinman v. 
Barclays Bank, 715 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 2000) (rejecting on the facts an 
independent claim for intentional spoliation of evidence by a third party); Weigl, 601 
N.Y.S.2d at 776 (refusing to recognize cause of action for spoliation). 
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instrument.”21 Because this definition is somewhat narrow and 
may not, for example, include situations where documents have 
been routinely discarded, many jurisdictions recognize a 
broader definition to include the losing, discarding, or giving 
away of evidence.22 New York, for example, broadly defines 
spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of 
evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as 
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”23 
Furthermore, though originally identified as the intentional 
destruction of evidence, spoliation now includes negligent or 
unintentional destruction of evidence.24 Jurisdictions, however, 
are not in full agreement as to what constitutes spoliation.25 
Some courts are more willing to find instances of spoliation 
than others, representing a disagreement among courts as to 
the relative importance of a victim’s right to be compensated 
and the potential for unduly burdening the alleged spoliator. 
Spoliation liability arises from a party’s duty to preserve 
evidence.26 For example, the duty automatically emerges when 
a party serves or is served with a judicial or administrative 
complaint.27 In such a situation, the party has actual knowledge 
  
 21 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). See also 
John K. Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Independent Tort Action 
May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO STATE L.J. 1135 (1992) (defining 
spoliation generally). 
 22 See Phoebe L. McGlynn, Spoliation in the Products Liability Context, 27 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 663, 665 (1997). 
 23 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 24 The Sixth Circuit has arguably adopted the broadest interpretation of 
spoliation, stating that “destruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs 
along a continuum of fault ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to 
intentionality.” See Shannon D. Hutchings, Tortious Liability for Spoliation of 
Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 382 (2000) (citing Welsh v. United States, 844 
F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
 25 For example, jurisdictions do not agree on whether “concealment” of 
evidence constitutes spoliation. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (concealment does not constitute 
spoliation of evidence under Florida law); Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135 
(D.D.C. 2001) (concealment and alteration are included in the definition of “willful 
destruction of evidence” under Ohio law). This difference is most likely due to the fact 
that concealed evidence has not been destroyed and may still be produced at trial. See 
Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. 
MARY’S L. J. 351, 408 (1994). 
 26 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 1. 
 27 See Scott v. I.B.M. Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233,248-49 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that 
a duty arises to preserve evidence whenever a party has been served with a complaint). 
See also Margaret O. Frossard and Neal S. Gainsberg, Spoliation of Evidence in 
Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. Traveler’s Insurance Co. [sic], 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 685 
(1997) (“[A] duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a 
statute . . . or another special circumstance.”) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 
 
 2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM 
1050 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
that litigation has begun and is therefore bound to preserve all 
discoverable evidence.28 A majority of courts have also held that 
a duty exists as soon as it is “reasonably foreseeable” that a 
lawsuit will ensue and that the evidence will be discoverable in 
connection with that suit.29 A duty does not arise, then, if 
litigation is “merely possible” as opposed to litigation that is 
“likely to be commenced.”30 Furthermore, a duty to maintain 
evidence may also be imposed by statute, regulation, or the 
ethical duties of the profession.31 Finally, the duty may attach if 
the party voluntarily assumes such a duty, as when a business 
implements a formal document retention policy.32 
The duty to preserve electronic evidence under a 
document retention policy is particularly troubling in light of 
increased reliance on computer data.33 Given the routine 
destruction of information stored on computers in the ordinary 
course of business pursuant to retention policies,34 it is difficult 
  
N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ill. 1995)).  
 28 Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 249. 
 29 See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 879, 888-89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(destruction of records may be found by a jury to be in anticipation of litigation, 
notwithstanding that no litigation, administrative action or congressional investigation 
had commenced). Furthermore, the moving party does not need to prove that the actual 
person who destroyed the evidence had notice of the litigation. See Testa v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The critical part of the foundation that 
must be laid depends on institutional notice—the aggregate knowledge possessed by a 
party and its agents, servants and employees.”). 
 30 Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 620-21 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(Defendant manufacturer destroyed documents in the ordinary course of business 
relating to a thirty-five-year-old product over which it had never been sued. Such 
destruction did not constitute spoliation of evidence because, in the court’s view, the 
mere possibility of future litigation was not enough.). Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, 
Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he obligation to preserve evidence even 
arises prior to the filing of a complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is 
likely to be commenced.”). Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996) (finding of spoliation where defendant destroyed documents after receiving 
complaint which alerted defendant that such documents were relevant and likely to be 
sought in discovery). See also Nolte, supra note 25, at 378. 
 31 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 4, 8. 
 32 Id. at 9. 
 33 Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence – A New 
Dimension to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421 (1999) 
(describing spoliation of electronic evidence as particularly thorny in the context of 
computer-related evidence). See generally Lawyer Lounge, an Internet resource center 
focusing on law office technology, which publishes an interactive page on electronic 
discovery, at http://lawyerlounge.com/ediscovery (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). 
 34 In assessing a document retention policy’s legal sufficiency, a court 
considers whether it is “reasonable” in light of the nature of the information. See 
Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era: Considerations for 
Corporate Counsel, 20 No. 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, Sept. 2003, at 16 (citing 
Lewy v. Remington Arms, 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988). For example, if the 
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to establish that such destruction amounts to spoliation.35 In 
particular, companies have a responsibility to suspend a 
document retention policy in the face of litigation to avoid 
spoliation charges.36 However, in some circumstances, courts 
have noted that this responsibility falls on the victim of alleged 
spoliation, thus creating confusion over which party must 
protect against routine destruction. The failure to save 
electronic evidence, whether before or during discovery, then, 
can be extremely harmful to a party’s case.  
Courts are generally reluctant to impose a duty to 
preserve evidence on third parties because they neither 
initiated nor necessitated the lawsuit.37 Such courts generally 
concur that imposing such a duty on non-litigants is unfair 
since it would interfere with their right to control and dispose 
of their personal property.38 However, exceptions to this general 
rule include third parties who are already bound to preserve 
evidence by statute, contract, agreement, or special 
relationship.39 In such instances, courts have held a third party 
accountable for spoliation.40  
  
information would likely be the subject of a dispute, it would be unreasonable to 
discard this data. Id. (citing Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112). Second, the court should 
determine whether a company instituted the document retention policy in bad faith. 
See Patrick Grady, Discovery of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based 
Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up More than Necessary? 14 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 539-40 (1996) (noting that courts look unfavorably at 
companies that appear to have instituted policies only to limit the amount of damaging 
evidence otherwise available).  
 35 Ironically, it is very common for a company to have a document retention 
policy in place but not to follow it. In Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., for 
example, the court observed that if the defendant, Fluor, had followed its document 
retention policy, the emails subject to the discovery dispute would have been destroyed, 
and the issue would have been moot. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 168, 171 (E.D. La. 2002). Instead, Fluor’s failure to follow its own 
policies resulted in the expenditure of considerable time and money in discovery 
disputes over the production of emails that should have been destroyed in the first 
place. Id. 
 36 See Dort & Spatz supra note 35, at 16. 
 37 Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging 
Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 657 (1998). See also discussion of the tort of spoliation in 
relation to third parties infra at III.C. 
 38 For example, numerous courts have held that neither ordinary tort law nor 
a state’s workers’ compensation act imposes a duty on employers to preserve evidence 
that might be used in an employee’s third-party claim against a product manufacturer 
or other defendant. See Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of 
Evidence – Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 LA. L. 
REV. 837, 852 (1998). 
 39 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Koplin v. Rosel Well 
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987)). 
 40 See Johnson v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239 
(Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence where the third-party insurer 
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Regardless of how the duty to preserve is defined, the 
spoliated evidence must still be relevant, discoverable, and 
material to a party’s claim.41 A court usually determines 
“whether there is any likelihood that the destroyed evidence 
would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by 
its destruction.”42 However, the effect of spoliation is, by its very 
nature, speculative.43 As one court has noted, “[w]hen 
attempting to determine the effect of missing evidence, ‘courts 
face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials 
whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.’”44 The 
burden thus falls on the prejudiced party to produce evidence 
suggesting that the destroyed evidence was relevant to 
substantiating its claim and would have been included in the 
case had it not been destroyed.45 Once this burden has been 
overcome, a court is then faced with the formidable challenge of 
imposing an appropriate remedy. 
II.  TRADITIONAL REMEDIES FOR THE SPOLIATION OF 
EVIDENCE 
When evidence is spoliated, courts have imposed 
traditional remedies against the spoliating party. These 
include an adverse inference instruction and sanctions such as 
dismissal, issue preclusion, summary judgment for the 
defendant and, in some cases, criminal penalties.46 The remedy 
a court chooses is intended to serve three purposes: deterrence, 
punishment, and remediation.47 For example, the court in 
  
accepts a specific request to preserve a particular vehicle, thus inducing reliance on the 
part of another); Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1995) (cause of action upheld against local police department for negligently 
disposing of evidence after plaintiff’s attorney had requested access to the evidence 
while it was in possession of the police). 
 41 Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 768.  
 42 Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 43 See Nolte, supra note 25, at 400 (noting impossibility of ascertaining extent 
to which spoliation harmed underlying action). 
 44 Robert D. Peltz, The Necessity of Redefining Spoliation of Evidence 
Remedies in Florida, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1289, 1337 (2002) (citing Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988) (citations omitted)). 
 45 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
 46 Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 774-75. 
 47 Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126. See also West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that while a district court has broad discretion 
in choosing an appropriate sanction for spoliation, the applicable sanction is intended 
to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation 
doctrine). 
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Pastorello v. City of New York,48 a recent New York case, 
imposed a sanction designed to: (1) deter parties from engaging 
in spoliation; (2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the 
party who wrongfully created the risk; and (3) restore the 
prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in 
absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing 
party.49 
A. Federal and State Remedies  
The remedy available to the nonspoliating party also is 
influenced by the forum where the spoliation occurs.50 For 
example, state courts usually apply the substantive law of the 
forum to spoliation claims.51 Federal courts, on the other hand, 
have divergent views. Some hold that spoliation during 
pending litigation is substantive and governed by state law, 
while others consider spoliation a procedural matter under the 
rules of federal procedure.52 Thus, similar facts may lead to 
different results depending upon the law of the state, and 
whether the action is brought in federal or state court.53 The 
distinction is significant as it can mean the difference between 
a case surviving and being dismissed.54  
In theory, courts have broad discretion in imposing 
sanctions for spoliation of evidence.55 In practice, they are faced 
with procedural constraints.56 For example, Federal Rule 37 
permits a court to sanction a party who spoliates evidence in 
  
 48 No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003).  
 49 Id. at *7 (quoting West, 167 F.3d at 779 (quoting Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 
126)). 
 50 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 2. 
   51 Id. 
 52 Cecilia Hallinan, Balancing the Scales After Evidence is Spoiled: Does 
Pennsylvania’s Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party? 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 
951-52 (1999); Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(holding that federal law applies as sanctions are within court’s inherent powers); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1267, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting 
that the duty to preserve a defective product is a substantive issue to be decided by 
state law), aff’d, 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 53 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 11 at 775. 
 54 Id. n.23 (citing Hank Grzlak, Federal, State Courts at Odds on Spoliation, 
PENN. L. WKLY., July 22, 1996 at 1 (explaining that in Pennsylvania, “if a key piece of 
evidence is missing in state court, the case has a good chance of being dismissed, even 
if the allegedly defective part is preserved,” whereas “[i]n federal court, the judge will 
impose some type of sanction, but the case is likely to survive”)). 
 55 Judge, supra note 18, at 446. 
 56 Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 865 (1991).  
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response to discovery and evidentiary requests.57 However, Rule 
37 usually will not apply to spoliation that occurs prior to 
litigation because the rule only governs sanctions for violations 
of a court order.58 Rule 37 is thus designed to enforce 
compliance with discovery rules rather than to punish the 
wrongdoer.59  
To address pre-litigation spoliation, courts have relied 
on their “inherent power” to control the judicial process and 
litigation.60 The power is limited, however, to measures 
necessary to redress conduct “which abuses the judicial 
process.”61 Though commentators have noted that some judges 
may be uncomfortable relying on inherent authority,62 the 
inherent powers have proven effective in permitting court-
ordered sanctions.63 In addition, some federal laws, 64 and many 
ethical rules, impose similar duties.65 Many state statutes 
authorize criminal sanctions against a party who destroys 
evidence.66 Regardless of their source of power, courts have 
significant latitude in deciding which discovery sanctions are 
appropriate under the circumstances.67  
  
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (authorizing sanctions for violations of discovery 
orders). Note that most states have a rule modeled after Rule 37. In New York, for 
example, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3126 (McKinney 2003) allows the court to impose penalties 
when parties refuse to comply with discovery or disclosure orders. 
 58 Hutchings, supra note 24, at 400-01 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37). 
 59 See Robinson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 1966) 
(explaining that FED. R. CIV. 37(d) secures compliance with discovery rules, rather than 
punishing parties); In re Marriage of Lai, 625 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“The 
purpose of discovery sanctions is to coerce recalcitrant parties to cooperate in 
accomplishing the required discovery, not to punish.”). 
 60 United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir.1993) 
(recognizing “that when a party deceives a court or abuses the process at a level that is 
utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice or undermines the 
integrity of the process, the court has the inherent power to dismiss the action.”). 
 61 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing the inherent power of the courts to fashion appropriate sanctions for 
conduct that disrupts the judicial process). 
 62 Judge, supra note 18, at 447 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002). 
 65 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2003) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 
destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”). 
 66 See Cassandra G. Sasso & Mary Price Birk, Discovery and Spoliation 
Issues in the High-Tech Age, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 81, 82. Moreover, because 
spoliation in the majority of states is a mere misdemeanor, a spoliator will likely prefer 
this minor criminal sanction as opposed to the risk of an enormous civil money 
judgment. See Jay E. Rivlin, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a 
Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1998). 
 67 See Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“A trial 
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Nonetheless, a court will not always sanction a 
spoliating party.68 Rather, courts typically attempt to balance a 
number of factors in determining whether sanctions for 
prelitigation document destruction are appropriate.69 New York 
courts, for example, simply ask whether a particular sanction 
is prejudicial and fair.70 This may explain why New York acts 
with relative impunity when applying the sanction of the 
adverse inference instruction.71 California courts, on the other 
hand, take a more precise approach in trying to arrive at an 
appropriate sanction. They apply a balancing test that consists 
of four factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of the harm to 
the injured party; (2) the nature and significance of the 
interests promoted by the actor’s conduct (was it unfair or 
immoral?); (3) the character of the means used by the actor; 
and (4) the actor’s motive (was the destruction of the records 
primarily to prevent their use in litigation?).72 California’s 
approach, then, offers a more tailored and, perhaps, more 
exacting and efficient remedy than that of New York’s.73   
  
court’s decision regarding sanctions for discovery violations . . . [is] discretionary, and 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”). See also 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707 
(1982); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 
1996). 
 68 See Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 766-67. 
 69 Id. See also Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 441 
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (citing Black v. United States, 389 F.Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1975)). 
 70 Fada Indust., Inc. v. Falchi Bldg. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (Sup. Ct. 
2001) (“In deciding whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence, courts will 
look to the extent that the spoliation of evidence may prejudice a party, and whether a 
particular sanction will be necessary as a matter of elementary fairness.”). 
 71 See discussions of adverse inference instruction infra Part II.B and New 
York’s Approaches to Spoliation infra Part IV. 
 72 Willard v. Caterpillar, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 621-26 (Cal. App. 1995). See 
Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 766-67 (discussing how California courts balance 
competing interests in deciding whether to impose sanctions for spoliation). Although 
the elements establishing a basis for imposition of sanctions are not settled, the 
prevailing consensus of courts is that sanctions are appropriate when a party (1) 
destroys discoverable matter (2) under its control (3) which the party knew or should 
have known (4) was relevant to pending, imminent or reasonably foreseeable litigation. 
See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.8 (1989). 
 73 Other factors that courts employ include the culpability of the spoliating 
party, the prejudice to the non-offending party, the degree of interference with the 
judicial process, whether lesser sanctions will remedy any harm and deter future acts 
of spoliation, whether evidence has been irretrievably lost, and whether sanctions will 
unfairly punish a party for misconduct by the attorney. However, as one court 
explained, “[t]hese factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent criteria 
for the . . . court to consider prior to imposing . . . a sanction.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds 
965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (considering whether dismissal was proper based on 
spoliation). 
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B.  Adverse Inference Instruction 
The adverse inference jury instruction is the most 
common and, arguably, most controversial, remedy for 
spoliation.74 Under this remedy, the court instructs the jury to 
presume that destroyed evidence, if produced, would have been 
adverse to the party that destroyed it.75 As one court has noted, 
“[i]t is a well-established and long-standing principle of law 
that a party’s intentional destruction of evidence relevant to 
proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the 
evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible 
for its destruction.”76  
For example, when a defendant destroys only records 
relating to a particular transaction on which the plaintiff is 
suing, there is a strong inference that those records would have 
demonstrated the defendant’s liability.77 Similarly, the 
destruction of documents in violation of a document retention 
policy gives rise to an inference that such documents were 
unfavorable to the party who destroyed them.78 In Latimore v. 
Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, for instance, the court found that 
“[t]he violation of a record-retention regulation creates a 
presumption that the missing record contained evidence 
adverse to the violator.”79 The inference, as a result, has 
remedial, punitive and deterrent objectives.80 The remedial 
  
 74 One of the earliest and most-cited decisions to recognize the adverse 
inference instruction was Armory v. Delemirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). In that 
case, a young chimney sweep found a ring with a jewel and asked a jeweler to appraise 
its value. The jeweler returned the ring to the boy but had removed the jewel, claiming 
at trial that it had been misplaced. The court held that unless the jewel was produced, 
the jury could presume it to be of the highest value possible for its size. The court, then, 
assumed that the jeweler would have produced the jewel had it been less valuable. Id. 
 75 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 291 
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
 76 Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 77 Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st 
Cir. 1982).  
 78 See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 
2001) (citing Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir.1998)) 
("The violation of a record[-]retention regulation creates a presumption that the 
missing record contained evidence adverse to the violator."); Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 
1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1994) (because employer violated record retention regulation, 
plaintiff “was entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the destroyed documents 
would have bolstered her case.”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1419 (10th 
Cir. 1987). See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of document 
retention policies relating to electronic evidence. 
 79 Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 80 JAMES WM MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37.121 (3d ed. 1997). See 
also Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 at *8 
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effect is designed to restore the prejudiced party to its previous 
position, as if the spoliation had not occurred.81 The punitive 
and deterrent effect is supposed to discourage and punish 
spoliation by placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on the 
party who wrongfully created such a risk.82 This often creates 
an unavoidable incentive for the spoliating party to settle 
where such party might otherwise have gone to trial. 
Regardless of these objectives, the instruction still allows a 
spoliating party to survive a motion for summary judgment or 
a motion to dismiss. The spoliation inference does, however, 
have its limitations.  
Most jurisdictions do not allow an adverse inference to 
substitute for an essential element of a plaintiff’s or 
defendant’s case.83 Therefore, a plaintiff suffering from 
spoliation cannot build his case on the spoliation inference 
alone. For the underlying claim to be actionable, the plaintiff 
must also possess some concrete evidence that will support the 
claim.84 Furthermore, the doctrine of adverse inferences cannot 
be applied to cases with third-party spoliators.85 Thus, the court 
will give the instruction only when the spoliator is a party to 
the lawsuit.86 
Although courts generally agree that an adverse 
inference instruction is appropriate when the spoliating party 
has violated a duty to preserve evidence, courts disagree on the 
  
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (“An adverse inference charge as a spoliation sanction has two 
underlying rationales, the first being remedial, to restore the prejudiced party to its 
previous evidentiary position; and the second being punitive, to act as a deterrent.”); 
Shaffer,169 F.R.D. at 25 (“An adverse inference charge serves the dual purposes of 
remediation and punishment.”).  
 81 See generally Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126 (stating that an adverse inference 
instruction serves the remedial purpose, “insofar as possible, of restoring the 
prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful 
destruction of evidence by the opposing party.”). 
 82 Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(“The adverse inference thus acts as a deterrent against even the negligent destruction 
of evidence.”). 
 83 Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So.2d 1357, 
1361 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“The traditional rule at common law will not substitute the 
adverse inference for plaintiff’s proof of an essential element of his or her case . . . .”) 
(Walter, J., concurring). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its 
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 365 (1999) 
(stating that, when the spoliator is a third party, “an adverse inference against the 
spoliator would serve no purpose.”).  
 86 See discussion of Tort for Third-Party Spoliation infra Part III.C. 
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requisite level of culpability.87 Some courts require the showing 
of “bad faith” or intentional destruction before giving a 
spoliation inference instruction.88 Generally, few courts have 
ruled that negligence is enough to support the giving of the 
instruction.89 Still other courts have yet to decide on a defined 
state of mind.90 Evidence, then, can be spoliated along a full 
range of culpability—it can be destroyed innocently, 
negligently, recklessly, intentionally, or in bad faith.91 
However, as one commentator has noted, as the 
culpability of the spoliating party decreases (from intent to 
innocence), so too does the appeal of the punitive and deterrent 
purpose underlying the inference.92 For example, where a party 
intentionally destroys evidence, such conduct gives rise to a 
strong inference that the party itself thought the evidence 
would be so harmful to its case that it was worth the risk of 
getting caught to destroy it.93 This intentional conduct should 
be punished in addition to placing the injured party in the 
same position it would have been absent the loss of evidence. 
Such punishment usually comes in the form of high damages 
  
 87 See Drew D. Dropkin, Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial 
Evidence Requirements for the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1805 (2002). 
 88 Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997); see also 
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must 
show willful conduct resulted in the loss or destruction of evidence).  
 89 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 
(2d Cir. 2002). See also Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 
F.2d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1982) (bad faith not necessary to establish inference); Turner v. 
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (in granting an adverse 
inference instruction based on the defendant’s negligent destruction of evidence, the 
court stated, “It makes little difference to the party victimized by the destruction of 
evidence whether that act was done willfully or negligently. . . . [T]he risk that the 
evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party 
responsible for its loss”). 
 90 Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1117 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) 
(noting that courts disagree whether bad faith or negligence is required). Second 
Circuit cases also offer different and shifting standards. See Byrnie v. Town of 
Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the law in the 
Second Circuit is unclear on what state of mind a party must have when destroying 
evidence). Compare Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp. 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(requiring intentional destruction) with Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group, Inc., 181 
F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999) (bad faith is not a “per se” rule, and gross negligence may 
suffice). 
 91 It is difficult to establish a uniform principle because of the ongoing debate 
about the proper role of inferences, rebuttable presumptions, and shifting burdens of 
production and persuasion. Some courts use these phrases interchangeably while other 
courts distinguish them. 
 92 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 36-37 (quoting Nation-Wide 
Check Corp., 692 F.2d at 218).  
 93 See Nesson, supra note 5, at 796. 
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awarded by the jury.94 Where the spoliation is merely negligent, 
however, a wrongdoer is arguably less culpable and should not 
be punished for acts that had no ulterior motive or purpose. 
Nevertheless, a jury could impose damages that had a punitive 
effect on even a negligent spoliator.95 The argument that a 
stronger inference would be appropriate where the spoliation is 
intentional is a valid one.96 For this reason, many courts require 
corroborating evidence of spoliation before imposing an adverse 
inference on negligent spoliators.97 As for those courts which do 
impose the inference on negligent spoliators, many impose a 
rebuttable presumption, allowing the spoliator to rebut the 
testimony of the spoliation victim.98 Thus, by permitting the 
defendant to give a reasonable explanation for the destruction 
  
 94 Although no systematic studies exist showing that the adverse inference 
instruction induces a jury to award high damages, commentators and lawyers have 
noted the instruction’s strong influence on jury decisions. For example, a jury returned 
a $55.8 million verdict for four plaintiffs who were struck by a train after hearing 
evidence that the train company had destroyed important tapes between the conductor 
of the train and a dispatcher. The plaintiffs’ lawyer noted that the adverse inference 
instruction conveyed to the jury the alleged institutionalization of spoliation in the 
upper echelons of rail companies and was key to cultivating large damage awards. See 
Nick Upmeyer, Verdicts Involving Railroads Produce Millions – And Lessons on 
Evidence, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at C20. (citing Barber v. Union Pacific, No. CIV-98-
312 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2002)). Another train accident case drew a $6 million verdict after 
the jury received an adverse inference instruction. According to the plaintiff’s lawyer, 
the jury was “disappointed that the railroad not only destroyed the documents but then 
came in and tried to explain it away.” See Howard Pankratz, Injured Rail Worker 
Awarded $6 Million, DENVER POST, Sept. 22, 2002, at B4. 
 95 Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1151 (recognizing that damages are not only 
speculative, but can be extremely disproportionate to culpability of negligent party). 
 96 See also Judge, supra note 18, at 445 (commenting that the adverse 
inference is predominantly applied to intentional destruction of evidence) (citing Beers 
v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996)) (noting that courts generally 
require a showing that spoliation was intentional before drawing an adverse inference 
against the party who has destroyed evidence). 
 97 Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(noting that the “corroboration requirement is even more necessary where the 
destruction was merely negligent, since in those cases it cannot be inferred from the 
conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even have been harmful to him.”). 
Residential Funding Corp. v. Degeorge Financial Corp. 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the 
negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its own 
negligence.”).  
 98 See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 221 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that, in cases where bad faith is not clear, courts tend to favor 
a rebuttable presumption that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the party 
responsible for its absence). See also Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 
(Ill. 1995) (stating that in a negligence action for the spoliation of evidence, a “plaintiff 
must demonstrate . . . that but for the defendant’s loss or destruction of evidence, the 
plaintiff had a reasonable probability of succeeding in the underlying suit.”). 
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of the evidence, the burden-shifting presumption is considered 
less severe for negligent spoliators.99 
The determination of whether to apply an adverse 
inference instruction to the facts of a case is ultimately left to 
the jury.100 For example, the jurors hear evidence by both 
parties relating to the factual question of whether the evidence 
was destroyed while in the control of the party against whom 
the inference would be drawn.101 If the jury determines the 
evidence does not amount to spoliation, then they will be 
instructed by the court not to employ the adverse inference 
instruction.102 If the jurors decide spoliation has occurred, they 
will factor the adverse inference into their deliberations.103 In 
either instance, the jury is allowed to hear not only evidence of 
the underlying claim, but evidence of the purported spoliation 
as well. Potentially, then, the evidence of spoliation informs 
and influences a jury’s decision as much, if not more so, than 
the underlying facts of the claim itself.104 
This risk of unduly prejudicing the position of the 
spoliator is a valid reason for not using the adverse inference 
instruction.105 For example, the inference has the potential to 
focus the jury’s attention on the spoliation itself, which is a 
collateral issue, and thereby distract the jury from the actual 
merits of the case. To prevent such prejudice, under Rule 403 of 
  
 99 In some instances, application of the rebuttable presumption is based on 
whether spoliation was committed by plaintiff or defendant, and not necessarily on the 
state of mind of the party who committed the act. Thus, destruction of evidence by the 
plaintiff often results in a jury instruction to draw an adverse inference while 
destruction by a defendant usually results in a jury instruction to view the inference as 
a rebuttable presumption. See Anthony J. Sebok, Spoliation in Modern Tort Litigation 
4 (Nov. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript prepared for symposium on “Ethical Issues 
in Mass Torts and Product Liability Litigation,” on file with author) (citing Vodusek v. 
Bayliner Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Rule 37)); Pastorello v. City of New 
York, No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (citing 
Rule 37); Hulett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 92-7110, 2002 WL 31010983 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2002). 
 100 See GORELICK, supra note 72, § 2.2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
37 and analogous state rules, a court can instruct a jury to draw an adverse inference 
from the absence of material evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 
(discussing power of court to sanction parties in violation of discovery orders under 
Federal Rule 37). 
 101 See GORELICK, supra note 72, § 3.11. 
 102 Even if a judge or magistrate determines that spoliation has occurred and 
orders an adverse inference instruction, the jury is nonetheless entitled to disregard it 
in making its decision. See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804. 
 105 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 70 
(rev. ed. 1985). 
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge may exclude evidence of 
spoliation if he determines it would pose a substantial danger 
of “confusi[ng] . . . the issues . . . or misleading the jury.”106 
Nonetheless, in situations where evidence is not excluded, a 
jury might still be tempted to return a verdict adverse to the 
spoliating party as a means of punishing the party for the 
misdeed, even if the jurors were not convinced of the spoliator’s 
liability.107 Thus, the probative value of using the inference 
might well be outweighed by the probative danger of unfairly 
penalizing the spoliator. 
Rule 403 may be an effective tool for a party resisting 
the use of the inference when the evidence will distract the jury 
from the merits of the case.108 The argument is convincing. For 
example, the question is not whether a defendant discarded 
train maintenance records, but whether a defendant was 
responsible for causing a train wreck that severely injured the 
plaintiff.109 However, trial judges do not simply exclude evidence 
relating to an event other than the central historical event on 
the merits of the case under Rule 403. On the contrary, in 
product liability actions, plaintiffs frequently introduce 
evidence of other accidents involving the same or a similarly 
designed product.110 Evidence of other accidents involving other 
victims is admissible to establish the existence of the defect in 
the product’s design.111 Thus, though judges exercise discretion 
to exclude evidence of spoliation that is collateral to the main 
action, they may still employ the adverse inference instruction 
  
 106 FED. R. EVID. 403. Under the legal relevance doctrine, codified in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge may exclude otherwise admissible, relevant 
evidence when she fears that the introduction of the evidence would generate “unfair 
prejudice” against the litigant.  
 107 Lawrence Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal 
Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1161 (1987). 
 108 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804. 
 109 In case where jury returned verdict of $30.1 million against railroad 
company for destroying tapes, plaintiff’s attorney noted that, “[The] fact [that the 
railroad company destroyed tapes] alone helped convince the jury that the rail 
company had something to hide.” See Upmeyer, supra note 94, at C20.  
 110 Mary A. Parker & Susan Garner, Special Evidentiary Issues in Products 
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 41 (“[U]nder the case law and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, evidence of similar accidents is normally admitted.”); see also Francis H. 
Hare, Jr. & Mitchell K. Shelly, The Admissibility of Other Similar Incident Evidence: A 
Three-Step Approach, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 541, 545-46 (Spring 1992) (“Courts have 
consistently held that evidence of other similar incidents is relevant to show either the 
existence of a defect or the relative danger of a condition or service.”). 
 111 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804 (noting that “from a jury’s point of view, 
there may be no more important evidence on the issue of the product’s defective 
condition than the performance and experience of that product in the real world.”). 
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when the destroyed evidence has significant probative worth on 
the historical merits of the case.112 
Proponents of the adverse inference emphasize that it 
avoids the costs of collateral litigation (such as an independent 
tort action based on intentional or negligent spoliation).113 Also, 
unlike the extreme remedies of dismissal or default judgment, 
the spoliation inference may be the most appropriate and 
proportional judicial response and may do the best job of fairly 
compensating the victimized party.114  
Critics of the spoliation inference generally fall into two 
camps. The first camp claims that the inference fails to achieve 
the objectives of punishment and deterrence. In this regard, 
the inference is insufficient as a punitive remedy because, even 
in its strongest application, it merely levels the playing field.115 
Furthermore, the inference may even encourage a plaintiff 
with a weak case to simply lose or destroy the product, endure 
the spoliation inference, and take his or her chances with the 
jury.116 Lastly, critics argue that the inference may be impotent 
as a deterrent because the jury has the discretion to dismiss 
the court’s instruction outright.117 Followers of this view, then, 
often see the inference as the least onerous sanction available 
to rectify spoliation.  
The second camp sees the inference as having the 
potential to be one of the most severe responses to spoliation. 
For example, such commentators fear that juries will be unduly 
influenced by destruction of evidence and will unfairly penalize 
litigants by means of the adverse inference instruction.118 These 
commentators also question the capacity of instructions on the 
scope of the inquiry to control the jury, particularly in cases in 
  
 112 Id. 
 113 See KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 40. 
 114 Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See generally David H. Canter, The Missing or Altered Product: Nightmare 
or Dream? 26 SW. U. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1997) (noting that after destroying evidence, 
plaintiffs can retain experts “who are able to forcefully argue their position without 
fear that defendant will have physical evidence to disprove theories.” (citing Bass v. 
General Motors, 929 F.Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Mo. 1996)). 
 117 KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 174 (citing Blinzler v. Marriot 
Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
 118 Solum, supra note 107, at 1093 (citing John MacArthur Maguire & Robert 
C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 
231 (1935)). 
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which the conduct of the spoliator was outrageous.119 For these 
critics, the inference would be more appropriate if used in a 
criminal, as opposed to civil, context.120  
C.  Discovery and Evidentiary Sanctions 
The discovery sanction is more precise, more diverse, 
and more tailored to the facts of the case than an adverse 
inference instruction.121 For example, courts can sanction 
spoliators by excluding evidence which is probative of the same 
issue or issues as the destroyed evidence, aiming to balance the 
parties’ conflicting interests. This sanction applies by excluding 
direct testimony relating to the spoliated evidence and any 
reports or secondary evidence, such as photos of the scene, 
taken by the expert.122 Excluding plaintiff’s expert testimony is 
a less severe sanction than dismissal, yet the practical result is 
often the same. If a plaintiff cannot introduce expert testimony 
relating to the defective condition of a product, the court may 
grant summary judgment to the defendant because there is not 
enough evidence to proceed.123 The plaintiff may, however, have 
other relevant evidence or may attempt to prove an alternative 
theory for the cause of the accident.124  
The sanction of dismissing the entire action or entering 
a default judgment is among the most severe sanctions within 
the court’s power for spoliation.125 Because this sanction is so 
  
 119 Id. (citing Maguire & Vincent, supra note 118, at 246). 
 120 Such critics note that in criminal cases the courts frequently admit 
testimony about an accused’s pretrial misconduct on the theory that the misconduct 
evidences the accused’s consciousness of guilt. For instance, if the accused destroys or 
conceals incriminating physical evidence, the prosecution may use this to help prove 
the accused’s culpability. By doing so, the prosecutor invites the jury to infer the 
accused’s guilt from the accused’s conduct. In effect, by acting in this manner, the 
accused “admits” his guilt. See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 796-97. 
 121 See Judge, supra note 18, at 445-46. 
 122 See, e.g., N. Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 282 (D. Me. 1993) 
(finding that while dismissal would be too severe, exclusion of the evidence was 
appropriate despite the lack of any showing that plaintiff acted deliberately); Headley 
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365-66 (D. Mass. 1991) (excluding plaintiff’s 
expert evidence due to the prejudice to defendant and the advantage plaintiff would 
obtain otherwise); Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., 587 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert regarding the cause of the fire in 
plaintiff’s garage after the evidence was destroyed). 
 123 See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.18 (D. 
Mass. 1991); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 369 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 124 See Unigard, 982 F.2d at 370. 
 125 See generally Miller v. Time-Warner Communications, Inc., 1999 WL 
739528 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1999) (holding that dismissal is appropriate if there is a 
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extreme, it is reserved for only the most egregious offenses, and 
may not be imposed if there is a lesser, but equally efficient, 
remedy available.126 However, some courts have not hesitated to 
impose this penalty against both plaintiff and defendant 
spoliators who were merely negligent.127  
In New York, for example, the negligent disposal of 
evidence before an adversary has had an opportunity to inspect 
it will suffice to enter a dismissal of the case.128 These sanctions 
may be imposed against parties to a lawsuit who violate the 
appropriate rules of discovery, or may even be imposed through 
the “inherent power” of the court itself.129  
D.  Criminal Penalties 
In addition to discovery and evidentiary sanctions, 
many jurisdictions have obstruction of justice statutes that 
impose criminal liability on spoliators of evidence.130 However, 
some courts have noted that obstruction of justice statutes do 
not provide sufficient deterrence because many violations are 
only misdemeanors.131 Moreover, it appears that prosecutors are 
unlikely to pursue obstruction of justice claims against 
spoliators in civil proceedings.132 Nonetheless, many federal 
  
showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault on the part of the sanctioned party). 
 126 See generally Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centers, 507 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 
1993) (reversing dismissal and remanding for further proceedings for the consideration 
of less restrictive sanctions for negligent spoliation).  
 127 Where plaintiff has negligently or intentionally destroyed relevant 
evidence, both federal and New York state courts will dismiss plaintiff’s suit. See 
Sebok, supra note 99, at 4 (citing Pucia v. Farley, 261 A.D.2d 83, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999)). Where defendant is the spoliator, however, federal courts are less willing to 
grant summary judgement for plaintiff, though New York courts have done this in 
some instances. Id. (citing DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 
41, 53 (App. Div., 1998)). But see Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 137 F.R.D. 657 
(C.D. Ill. 1991) (federal court granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment). 
 128 Cummings v. Central Tractor Farm & Country Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 285 
(App. Div. 2001) (holding that party need not act intentionally, contumaciously, or in 
bad faith in connection with loss or destruction of evidence to impose ultimate sanction 
of directing judgment against it or dismissing suit). 
 129 See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 649 (citing Bachmeier, 507 N.W.2d at 533). 
 130 Id. at 650 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2809 (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
135 (1999); and MINN. STAT. § 609.63(7)(2003)). 
 131 See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App. 1984) (“If 
crucial evidence could be intentionally destroyed by a party to a civil action who 
thereby stands to gain substantially monetarily by such destruction, the effect of a 
misdemeanor would be of minimal deterrence.”), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. 
Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 n.4 (Cal. 1998). For a discussion of Smith, see infra 
text and accompanying notes 140-145. 
 132 See Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many 
Torts Spoliate the Broth? 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (2002) (citing Smith, 198 Cal. 
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obstruction of justice statutes have recently been amended 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002133 which arguably makes 
the imposition of criminal sanctions a more viable option for 
prosecutors and courts alike. 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPOLIATION TORT 
Courts in general have been cautious in recognizing or 
applying any independent tort of spoliation. In fact, only a few 
courts have developed a policy toward holding spoliators of 
evidence liable in tort.134 Similar to judicial remedies, spoliation 
as a tort furthers the goals of deterrence, punishment and 
remediation. However, unlike such remedies, the separate tort 
allows recovery of punitive damages in addition to the 
originally contemplated damages.135 As a result, advocates of 
the tort argue that a spoliator may be even more disinclined to 
destroy incriminating evidence considering he has much to 
lose.136 States adopting the tort have noted that traditional 
remedies are inadequate as they do not fully compensate the 
spoliation victim.137 Furthermore, the tort is the only remedy 
that allows a plaintiff to recover directly from third-party 
spoliators.138 Ultimately, an independent tort of spoliation 
  
Rptr. at 835) (“We know of no prosecution under California Penal Code section 135 – 
adopted in 1872 . . . for destroying or concealing documentary evidence relevant only to 
prospective civil action.”). See also United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that civil discovery remedies might be insufficient at times, 
and that the federal obstruction of justice statute was applicable, regardless of the fact 
that it had never previously been used in a civil destruction of evidence context). 
 133 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, largely a response to the Arthur Andersen 
accounting scandal, imposes steep fines and up to twenty-year prison terms for anyone 
found guilty of destroying corporate audit records or altering, destroying, or falsifying 
documents to impede a contemplated or pending federal investigation, bankruptcy, or 
official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 1519, and 1520. For a brief explanation of the 
Andersen accounting scandal, see Chase, supra note 7, at 745-63. 
 134 See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) 
(adopting the tort of willful spoliation and listing its elements). See also Nolte, supra 
note 25, at 359. 
 135 See Nolte, supra note 25, at 402. 
 136 In fact, damages in a spoliation action can amount to several millions of 
dollars. See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 633-34 (citing Margaret Cronin Fisk, Looking for 
a New Cause of Action? NAT’L L.J., May 19, 1997, at A11 (describing one spoliation case 
in which the jury awarded the plaintiff $9,000,000 and another case in which spoliation 
was a key factor in a $12,000,000 settlement)). 
 137 Rivlin, supra note 66, at 1005 (noting that court’s remedial power is 
severely limited when spoliation is discovered after entry of final judgment); see also 
Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1139 (discussing traditional remedies’ inadequacy in 
compensating aggrieved party and deterring spoliator). 
 138 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also discussion of tort of 
third-party spoliation infra Part III.B. 
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allows the injured party to bring an action against the spoliator 
for damages caused solely by evidence destruction.139   
A. Tort of Intentional Spoliation 
Smith v. Superior Court, a 1984 California case, is the 
landmark decision recognizing a tort action for the intentional 
spoliation of evidence.140 Smith was severely injured when the 
wheel of an oncoming van broke loose and crashed through her 
windshield.141 The van was brought to Abbott Ford, the garage 
which had originally put the wheels on the van in the accident. 
Abbott Ford, however, failed to retain the parts of the wheel 
involved in the accident after promising to do so.142 Smith 
alleged that her expert needed the lost parts to determine the 
cause of the accident.143 The California Court of Appeals found 
that Smith had stated a valid claim against Abbott Ford and, 
thus, created a new tort.144 The court acknowledged that the 
most troubling aspect of allowing an intentional spoliation 
cause of action was the speculative nature of determining 
damages, yet concluded that the societal interest in deterrence 
outweighed the damages concern.145 Only a few jurisdictions 
have followed Smith’s lead and adopted the separate tort of 
intentional spoliation.146 Although each jurisdiction employs a 
  
 139 Levine, supra note 132, at 428 (citing Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 
F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1999); Temple Cmty. Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 
1999); and Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998) as examples where the 
spoliation inference was used as the basis for denial of the recognition of a spoliation 
tort). See discussion of reasons for rejecting spoliation tort infra Part III.D. 
 140 Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).  
 141 Id. at 831. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 832 (quoting William Prosser, noting that “[n]ew and nameless torts 
are being recognized constantly,” and “[t]he common threat woven in all torts is the 
idea of an unreasonable interference with the interests of others”). 
 145 Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36 (the court analogized the emerging tort to 
the recognized tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage on 
the basis that the opportunity to win a lawsuit is the same type of “valuable probable 
expectancy” as the opportunity to obtain a contract). 
 146 Courts in Alaska, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana and 
Ohio have recognized the tort of intentional spoliation. See Hazen v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Ak. 1986); St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 
33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F.Supp. 831, 
836 (D. Kan. 1992); Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 11 (Mont. 1999); 
Viviano v. CBS Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Coleman v. 
Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 185 (N.M. 1995); and Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 
615 N.E.2d 1037, 1037 (Ohio 1993). See also Margaret A. Egan, Tort Law – Spoliators 
Beware, But Fear Not an Independent Suit, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 233, 250 
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slightly different formulation, the general elements of the 
intentional spoliation tort include: (1) the existence of a 
potential civil action; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the potential 
action; (3) destruction of evidence; (4) intent; (5) causal 
inability to prove the lawsuit or proximate cause; and (6) 
damages.147 
B.  Tort of Negligent Spoliation 
 
Five months after Smith, the Third District Court of 
Appeal in Florida recognized a separate cause of action for the 
negligent spoliation of evidence in Bondu v. Gurvich.148 Bondu 
noted that a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence may only 
stand if the spoliator owed a duty to the plaintiff to preserve 
evidence.149 Thus, negligent spoliation is characterized by a lack 
of intent and an explicit recognition to preserve evidence for 
another party’s use.150 A few states have followed Florida and 
recognized negligent spoliation of evidence as a cause of 
action.151 
The recognition of intentional and negligent spoliation 
as a separate tort did not create the following that proponents 
of the tort had hoped for. In fact, the California Supreme Court 
overruled Smith fourteen years later in Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. 
  
(2001) (noting that, similar to Smith v. Superior Court, courts recognizing the separate 
tort of spoliation have likened the harm arising from the destruction of evidence to that 
suffered by plaintiffs in cases involving intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage). 
 147 See Levine, supra note 132, at 422. 
 148 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 
1986). Bondu involved a hospital that lost the plaintiff’s anesthesia records and was 
subsequently unable to provide them to the plaintiff on his request. Id. at 1312. 
 149 The defendant hospital in fact had such a duty to save Bondu’s medical 
records. Id. at 1313. 
 150 See Judge, supra note 18, at 449 (citing Continental Insurance Co. v. 
Herman 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)) (suggesting the following 
elements for the negligent spoliation of evidence tort: (1) the existence of a potential 
civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the 
potential civil action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the 
ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the evidence destruction 
and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages). 
 151 Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Kansas and the District of Columbia have 
recognized a cause of action for spoliation to include negligence as a basis of liability. 
See Digiulio v. Prudential Prop & Cas. Ins. Co. 710 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998); 
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-
Car, 180 F.3d 294, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that negligent or reckless spoliation of 
evidence is an independent and actionable tort). See Foster, 809 F. Supp. at 836 
(recognizing cause of action for intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence). 
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v. Superior Court,152 holding that a party may not bring a 
separate cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence. 
The court weighed several factors such as: (1) the availability of 
other remedies; (2) the inherently difficult task of calculating 
damages; and (3) the prospect of meritless spoliation actions.153 
The court also noted that a separate tort imposes indirect costs 
in preservation of otherwise valueless evidence.154 Although the 
California Court of Appeals still recognizes claims for negligent 
spoliation,155 the Cedars-Sinai decision cast a pall over this 
cause of action as well.156  
 Despite courts’ increasingly harsh approaches to 
spoliation over the last several years, the recent trend among 
jurisdictions has been to reject the tort as it relates to first 
parties.157 Rather than recognize a new tort, courts have decided 
to employ court-enforced sanctions against the spoliator in the 
underlying litigation.158 Courts have noted the costs to 
defendants as well as the speculative nature of spoliated 
evidence as additional reasons for not recognizing the tort.159 
  
 152 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 153 Id. at 515. The court thoroughly examined these three areas: (1) holding 
that a remedy for litigation-related misconduct should not create a “spiral of lawsuits” 
and should recognize the need for finality in adjudication; (2) holding that the non-tort 
remedies of evidentiary inference, discovery sanctions, disciplinary sanctions for 
attorneys involved, and criminal penalties seem sufficient; and (3) distinguishing an 
“uncertainty of the fact of harm” from mere uncertainty of amount of damages. The 
issue of harm to damages was too speculative for a tort remedy to solve. Id. at 515-16.  
 154 Id. at 519. 
 155 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998); Johnson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 156 Some commentators see room for negligent spoliation claims, cautioning 
that the California Supreme Court would likely require the “legal duty” it mentioned at 
the start of its analysis. See Jerrold Abeles & Robert J. Tyson, Spoil Sport, L.A. LAW., 
Nov. 1999, at 41. 
 157 In fact, less than one month after Cedars-Sinai, the Texas Supreme Court 
declined to recognize an independent cause of action for either intentional or negligent 
spoliation. See Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998). Levine, supra note 
132, at 421-22 (citing KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 64-66). 
 158 See generally Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420 (Mass. 
2002) (noting there is no cause of action for spoliation of evidence when appropriately 
tailored sanctions imposed in the underlying action are a more efficacious remedy for 
spoliation than allowing a separate, inherently speculative cause of action for such 
litigation misconduct). 
 159 Dowdle Butane Gas Co., v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002) 
(Supreme Court refused to recognize intentional spoliation of evidence against 
spoliators as independent cause of action, where there were sufficient other avenues 
and where costs to defendants and courts would have been enormous, particularly from 
risks of erroneous determinations of liability due to uncertainty of harm. The court also 
noted risk of excessive costs from extraordinary measures required to preserve, for 
indefinite periods, items for purposes of avoiding potential spoliation liability in future 
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Nonetheless, at least three courts have recognized the 
spoliation tort for claims against third-parties since 1998.160 
C.  Tort of Third-Party Spoliation 
The recent recognition of the tort of third-party 
spoliation may, indeed, be because it is the only remedy 
available against such spoliators. For example, because third 
parties are not part of the underlying, original lawsuit, 
inferences and sanctions cannot be used against them.161  
Therefore, without a third-party spoliation tort, “there may be 
no civil remedy to compensate a litigant who is victimized by a 
nonparty spoliator.”162 For this reason, even some of the tort’s 
harshest critics support its use as protection against third-
party spoliation.163 Indeed, several jurisdictions recognize a tort 
for the negligent and/or intentional spoliation of evidence by 
third parties because of the perceived failure of traditional 
remedies in the third-party context.164  
D.   Challenges to Recognition of the Tort of Spoliation 
Recognizing the tort of spoliation, whether for first 
parties or third parties, causes three significant problems. 
First, it imposes a duty on the owner or custodian of the 
  
litigation. Any benefits obtained by recognizing spoliation tort, noted the court, were 
outweighed by burdens imposed.). 
 160 See, e.g., Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000); Oliver v. 
Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont. 1999); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180 
F.3d 294, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 161 See Levine, supra note 132, at 438 n.128 (citing Elias v. Lancaster Gen 
Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1998)) (stating that “traditional remedies would 
be unavailing, since the spoliator is not a party to the underlying litigation.”). See also 
Levine, supra note 132, at 441. 
 162 See Judge, supra note 18, at 459. 
 163 For example, one year after Cedars-Sinai, the California Supreme Court 
held in Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court that no cause of action existed 
for the intentional spoliation of evidence by third parties. Temple Community Hospital 
v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 223, 224 (Cal. 1999). However, the court was badly divided, 
with the author of Cedars-Sinai writing the dissenting opinion. The dissent noted that 
third-party spoliation is particularly troubling. See id. at 234-35. 
 164 The District of Columbia, Montana, and Alabama have recognized a 
general tort action for spoliation, but only for nonparties. See, e.g., Oliver, 993 P.2d at 
18 (recognizing tort of spoliation of evidence, which may be negligent or intentional, as 
“an independent cause of action” with respect to third parties); Smith v. Atkinson, 771 
So.2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000); Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 136-40 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). But see Dowdle 831 So.2d at 1135 (refusing to recognize 
intentional spoliation of evidence against first- and third-party spoliators as 
independent causes of action). 
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evidence to preserve it.165 Arguably, this would “outweigh the 
owner or custodian’s general right to use, modify, or destroy his 
own property.”166 Some courts, understandably, have been 
reluctant to find this duty in the absence of a relationship 
between the parties or a statutory mandate that the evidence 
be maintained for, and accessible to, the plaintiff.167 
A second, and perhaps more troubling, problem is 
determining the requisite tort element of damages.168 Because 
spoliation damages are speculative, courts have struggled to 
meet the traditional damages standard under which a plaintiff 
must establish the amount of damages with reasonable 
certainty.169 In a sense, the jury must “quantify the 
unquantifiable.”170 Some jurisdictions reject the tort of 
spoliation until resolution of the underlying suit, believing that 
the suit’s completion would satisfy the certainty requirement 
for damages.171 Other courts have held that damages for 
spoliation should not be awarded in addition to damages on the 
underlying cause of action.172 Commentators point out, however, 
  
 165 See KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 54. 
 166 BELL, KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 11, at 783 (citing Ortega v. 
Trevino, 983 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 167 See Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181-82 (Kan. 
1987).  
 168 Delgado v. Mitchell, 55 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (stating that 
“a damage award must be based on more than a ‘gossamer web of shimmering 
speculation and finely-spun theory.’”); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 
1312, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (noting calculation of damages as most difficult aspect of 
spoliation of evidence tort). 
 169 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
165 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that actual loss is necessary in negligence cases). See also 
Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 381, 836 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying 
Kansas law and finding that plaintiffs’ inability to identify damages arising from 
spoliation of evidence that were distinct from those of their underlying malpractice 
claim deprived them of the ability to bring an independent action for spoliation). 
 170  Nolte, supra note 25, at 394, (quoting Chris Goodrich, Gone Today, Here 
Tomorrow, CAL. LAW., June 1984, at 15 (quoting California attorney Raoul D. 
Kennedy)). 
 171 See e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 
456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905, 913 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Petrik, 501 N.E.2d at 1322; Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 
1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See also Paul Garry Kerkorian, Negligent Spoliation of 
Evidence: Skirting the “Suit Within a Suit” Requirement of Legal Malpractice, 41 
HASTING L.J. 1077, 1101 (1990) (noting that this requirement, however, might be 
considered inconsistent with the spoliation tort as a tort of interference that protects 
lost probable expectancies and undermines the nature of the tort as an independent 
tort action). 
 172 Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d 1014, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997) (worker’s spoliation damages would have to be reduced by the amount of the 
workers compensation lien). 
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that damages speculative by nature should not per se preclude 
a plaintiff from recovery.173 Regardless of the uncertainty of 
damages, an injured person should not be denied relief.174 
Third, courts rejecting an independent spoliation tort 
often stress the “important interest of finality in 
adjudication.”175 A spoliation tort may lead to judicial 
inefficiency by re-litigating adjudicated issues.176 Recognizing 
the tort could also violate long-standing principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.177 Arguably, this consequence 
only occurs when the spoliation tort is brought after the 
underlying action has ended, not when the tort is claimed in 
the original action.178 Moreover, if non-tort remedies for 
spoliation are sufficient, recognizing a third-party spoliation 
tort might have little impact on the interest of finality in 
adjudication.179 
Despite these arguments challenging the spoliation tort, 
the policy considerations of deterrence may provide support for 
wider recognition.180 The possibility of punitive damages may do 
more to deter and prevent destruction of evidence than 
traditional remedies.181 Conversely, allowing punitive damages 
could potentially enable a party with an otherwise minimal 
claim against the spoliator to recover excessive damages.182  
  
 173 See Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1145-46. 
 174 Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) 
(“[W]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the 
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles 
of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer 
from making any amend for his acts.”). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 
U.S. 251, 264- 65 (1946) (recognizing that the most elementary notions of public policy 
require the wrongdoer to “bear the risk of the uncertainty” which his own wrong has 
established). 
 175 See, e.g., Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135 
(Miss. 2002); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 515-16 (Cal. 
1998) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (Cal. 1990).  
 176 See Celcilia Hallinan, Balancing the Scales After Evidence is Spoiled: Does 
Pennsylvania’s Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party? 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 
973-74 (1999). 
 177 Rubin, supra note 85, at 367. 
 178 Nolte, supra note 25, at 423. 
 179 Rubin, supra note 85, at 366-67 (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 829, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1984)), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior 
Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 180 See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 631. 
 181 See Nesson, supra note 5, at 803; Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 635 
N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the “act of altering and destroying records to 
avoid liability . . . is particularly deserving of punishment in the form of punitive 
damages.”). 
 182 In fact, in cases involving a defective product, or in any complex litigation, 
 
 2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM 
1072 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
IV.  NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO SPOLIATION 
The approach of New York state courts in addressing 
spoliation poses two problems. First, the courts do not take the 
culpability of a spoliator into account when determining what 
sanction to apply. Instead, New York simply asks whether a 
particular sanction is fair to the injured party and not unduly 
prejudicial to the spoliator.183 This allows the court to fashion 
harsh sanctions, such as the adverse inference instruction, 
with relative impunity and not according to the culpability of 
the spoliator. Second, New York does not recognize the tort of 
third-party spoliation. By definition, third parties are not 
parties to an underlying suit and therefore are beyond the 
reach of tradition remedies for spoliation. Therefore, third-
party spoliators often go unpunished in New York State. 
A. Use of Traditional Remedies 
Historically, New York decisions have applied strong 
sanctions even for inadvertent, negligent spoliation of 
evidence.184 For example, in Cummings v. Central Tractor Farm 
& Country Inc.,185 the court noted that a party need not act 
intentionally, contumaciously, or in bad faith in connection 
with loss or destruction of evidence to impose the ultimate 
sanction of striking the party’s pleadings and directing 
judgment against it. New York has justified this severe 
approach because, as one court noted, it is the “unfairness [in] 
allowing a party to destroy evidence and then to benefit from 
that conduct or omission” that informs such decisionmaking.186 
This approach, however, produces two troubling consequences.  
First, it allows New York to employ any sanction with 
relative impunity. Instead of balancing a list of factors, such as 
  
the spoliating party might be a multi-million dollar corporation against whom such a 
recovery would be viable. See Robert Walter Thompson, To the Prevailing Party Goes 
the Spoils: An Overview of An Emerging Tort in California, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 223, 
242 (1990). 
 183 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 184 See Kirkland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (App. 
Div. 1997) (holding that housing authority’s destruction of stove required dismissal of 
complaint as spoliation sanction, regardless of whether destruction was intentional or 
negligent). See Squitieri v. City of New York, 669 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App. Div. 1998) 
(“[D]ismissal [is] warranted when discovery orders were not violated, and even when 
the evidence was destroyed prior to the action being filed . . . notwithstanding that the 
destruction was not malicious . . . or in bad faith.” (citations omitted)). 
 185 722 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2001). 
 186 See Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 611. 
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the spoliator’s motive, as California does,187 New York simply 
asks whether a sanction is fair to the injured party and not 
unduly prejudicial to the spoliator.188 Thus, New York courts 
have used dismissal, the most severe of all sanctions, in cases 
based on merely negligent spoliation. Though this may seem 
fair and unprejudicial to New York courts, many other courts 
would disagree.189  
Second, New York does not employ any kind of test 
before imposing the adverse inference instruction. Instead, it 
simply applies the inference if it believes dismissal would be 
too severe a sanction.190 In fact, the New York Court of Appeals 
has rejected appellants’ claims that the inference was an 
improper remedy for spoliation.191 Though the inference may 
indeed be less harmful than the more severe sanction of 
dismissal,192 its potentially onerous effects have been largely 
disregarded by New York courts.  
B.  Refusal to Adopt Tort of First-Party Spoliation  
Almost all lower New York court decisions and many 
federal court decisions interpreting New York state law adhere 
to the majority view of courts throughout the country by 
denying a cause of action for spoliation.193 The New York 
Supreme Court refused to adopt an independent tort for first-
  
 187 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 188 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. 
 190 Metro. New York Coordinating Council on Jewish Poverty v. FGP Bush 
Terminal, Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (App. Div, 2002) (Because “disposed-of evidence 
was not key to the proof of plaintiff’s case, the supreme court properly exercised its 
discretion in limiting its sanction against defendant Allboro for spoliation to an adverse 
inference charge.”). 
 191 Barlow v. Werner Co., 743 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div. 2002) (“Because 
the plaintiffs’ spoliation of evidence was unintentional and did not deprive the 
appellant of a means of establishing its defense, the Supreme Court providently 
exercised its discretion in . . . directing that a negative inference charge be given.”). 
 192 See supra text and accompanying notes 125-29 (discussing dismissal as 
“drastic” sanction). 
 193 See, e.g., Tiano v. Jacobs, No. 98 Civ. 6229 DC, 2001 WL 225037, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2001); Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 44 F.Supp.2d 565, 
586 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Tietjen v. Hamilton-Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., Nos. 97-CV-188 & 
97-CV-949, 1998 WL 865586, at *3 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 25, 1998); Whittlesey v. Espy, No. 96 
Civ. 0671, 1996 WL 689402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1996) (“[P]laintiff cannot allege a 
separate cause of action based upon a defendant’s spoliation of evidence.”); Mondello v. 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., No. 94 Civ. 4383, 1996 WL 239890, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 
1996) (noting that plaintiff cannot “state[ ] a claim for destruction of evidence under 
New York law”). 
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party spoliation of evidence in Pharr v. Cortese.194 Regardless of 
Pharr, plaintiffs continue to bring causes of action for 
spoliation in New York and, not surprisingly, most courts have 
continued rejecting them.195 For example, in the recent case of 
Hulett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,196 two infant 
plaintiffs who were struck and injured on railroad tracks197 
sought to assert a cause of action for first-party spoliation.198 
Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant railroad companies 
negligently destroyed dispatcher records relevant to their 
case.199 The court found sufficient evidence to prosecute a cause 
of action based on negligence, but denied the spoliation claim 
because no prior relationship existed between the parties.200 
New York, then, has effectively precluded any plaintiff from 
bringing a cause of action based on first-party spoliation. 
C.  Modified Recognition of Third-Party Spoliation 
However, a few New York cases have acknowledged an 
independent cause of action for third-party spoliation.201 Such 
cases mainly address the circumstance in which an employer is 
sued by his employee for spoliation of evidence and the 
resulting impairment of the employee’s suit against a third-
party tortfeasor. For example, in DiDomenico v. C & S 
Aeromatik Supplies, Inc.,202 the court allowed the plaintiff to 
bring a separate direct cause of action against his employer 
where the employer impaired his right to sue a third-party 
tortfeasor by destroying all of the evidence. Even under that 
  
 194 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 196 No. 92-7110, 2002 WL 31010983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug 1, 2002). 
 197 Id. at *1. 
 198 Id. at *7. 
 199 The railroad companies were required to keep dispatcher records “for three 
years but they destroyed them prior to that date in contravention of their own policy as 
well as that of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Id. at *6. 
 200 Id. at *8. The court also noted the typical considerations arguing against 
the creation of the spoliation tort such as the uncertainty of the existence or extent of 
damages; interference with a person’s right to dispose of his property as he chooses; 
and inconsistency with policy favoring final judgement. Id. at *8. See also discussion of 
separate tort of spoliation supra Part III. 
 201 See, e.g., Ripepe v. Crown Equip. Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (App. Div. 
2002); DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 452, 460 (App. Div. 
1998); Vaughn v. City of New York, 607 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1994); Weigl v. Quincy 
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). 
 202 682 N.Y.S.2d at 460. 
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line of cases, however, the employer’s duty to preserve evidence 
is limited.203  
In the most recent case to recognize third-party 
spoliation, Fada Industries, Inc. v. Falchi Building Co., L.P.,204 
the court extended the employer/employee basis for third-party 
spoliation to that of an insurer/insured relationship.205 In Fada, 
the court held that a cause of action may be asserted by an 
insured against his insurer where the insurer allegedly 
destroyed evidence crucial to the insured’s defense in the 
underlying action.206 However, even if a third-party spoliator is 
an insurer, there is no guarantee that a plaintiff will 
successfully bring a separate cause of action against such a 
third party.207 Nonetheless, absent a special relationship 
between plaintiff and third parties, New York courts are 
unwilling to recognize a cause of action for third-party 
spoliation.208 
  
 203 Weigl, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (finding that New York does not recognize a 
separate tort of spoliation, but does recognize similar common law cause of action in 
employment law). 
 204 730 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
 205 Id. A tenant sued the owner and manager of its building and a cotenant to 
recover for property damage caused by the cotenant’s leaking water heater. Before 
commencement of that action, the cotenant’s insurer took possession of the water 
heater, which subsequently was lost or destroyed while in the possession of an agent of 
the insurer. The cotenant impleaded its own insurer for its negligent loss of the water 
heater, theorizing that such loss had impaired its ability to defend the action and had 
prevented it from impleading the entities that negligently manufactured, installed or 
repaired the water heater. The insurer moved to dismiss the third-party complaint 
against it, but the court denied the motion, thereby sustaining the third-party claim for 
negligent spoliation of evidence/impairment of defense. Id. at 831 
 206 Id. The court in Fada stated that “[t]he facts of [Fada] clearly support 
extending the DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies decision, which applies to an 
employer-employee relationship, to the insured-insurer relationship, and to the 
recognition of a negligent spoliation cause of action under circumstances such as those 
presented here.” Id. at 838. 
 207 Sterbenz v. Attina, 205 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Plaintiff sued 
the insurer and one of its claims agents, alleging spoliation of evidence and impairment 
of her products liability claim against the manufacturer of the car. The court for the 
Eastern District of New York granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment 
dismissing the action, declaring any claim for spoliation of evidence groundless under 
New York law and determining the insurer’s conduct to have been reasonable in any 
event. See id. at 71-73. 
 208 See generally Steinman v. Barclays Bank, 715 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 
2000), dismissing appeal from, 727 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2001) (rejecting on the facts an 
independent claim against Barclays Bank for intentionally withholding certain 
presumably canceled travelers' checks from third-party plaintiff).  
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V.  PROPOSALS 
A.  Use of Spoliator’s Culpability When Determining 
Sanctions and Applying Adverse Inference Instruction 
New York state courts might consider refining their 
approach to spoliation through greater consideration of the 
particular facts and circumstances of a given case. First, New 
York state courts should take the spoliators’s culpability into 
account when fashioning a spoliation remedy. For example, 
New York federal courts consider the culpability of a spoliator 
as one of the most important factors in determining whether 
sanctions for spoliation are appropriate.209 This means that a 
negligent spoliator would be much less likely to receive a harsh 
sanction, such as dismissal, than an intentional spoliator.  
Second, New York state courts should apply a test 
before applying the adverse inference instruction. In New York 
federal courts, for example, the party seeking the instruction 
must establish the following three elements: (1) that the party 
having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve 
it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were 
destroyed with a “culpable state of mind”; and (3) that the 
destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s claim or 
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it 
would support that claim or defense.210 A “culpable state of 
mind” for purposes of a spoliation inference includes ordinary 
negligence.211  
When the destruction is negligent, relevance must be 
proven by the party seeking the inference.212 When evidence is 
destroyed in bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), on the 
other hand, that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate 
relevance.213 By adopting a test similar to New York’s federal 
courts for the adverse inference instruction, state courts would 
  
 209 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 
1996) (“Two of the factors . . . have taken on greater importance in most of the cases on 
sanctions for spoliation: (1) the culpability of the offender, or the alleged mental state 
which gave rise to the destruction of evidence, and (2) the degree of prejudice or harm 
which resulted from the actions of the offender.”). 
 210 See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 211 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 109. 
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employ a more tailored and appropriate remedy, especially for 
negligent spoliators.  
Finally, if New York is unwilling to apply such a test, it 
should at least require intent instead of negligence for the 
adverse inference instruction. In fact, few states besides New 
York have expanded the inference to negligent spoliation.214 
Were the inference merely remedial, as some commentators 
assume, then it might be a more appropriate remedy for a 
negligent offender.215 Ultimately, New York’s spoliation remedy 
should more closely correspond to the spoliator’s culpability or 
scienter.216  
B.  Broader Recognition for Third Party Spoliation Tort 
New York must also recognize a broader tort of third-
party spoliation. By limiting the tort to third parties who are 
employers or certain insurers, New York risks allowing the 
destruction of evidence by other classes of third parties to go 
unchecked. Furthermore, the state’s refusal to recognize a tort 
for first-party intentional or negligent spoliation certainly does 
not preclude it from recognizing a tort for third-party 
spoliation. Thus, the court’s recent statement in Metlife Auto & 
Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc. that “it stands to reason that 
those courts that do not recognize [a tort for intentional or 
negligent spoliation] against a first party likewise would not 
recognize one against a third party” is unreasonable.217 Because 
sanctions may not be levied upon a disinterested, independent 
third party, an independent tort action for third-party 
spoliation of evidence is the only means to deter the third-party 
destruction of evidence and to compensate the aggrieved party. 
Moreover, if courts believe that “[n]on-tort remedies for 
spoliation are sufficient in the vast majority of cases,” then 
recognition of a third-party spoliation tort will have little 
overall impact on the interest of finality in adjudication.218 
  
 214 See, e.g., Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I. 
1999); Lagalo v. Allied Corp., 592 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Squitieri v. 
City of New York, 669 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App. Div. 1998). Several federal circuit courts 
of appeal have followed suit. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
 215 Dropkin, supra note 87, at 1828. 
 216 See Peltz, supra note 44, at 1336. 
 217 753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276 (App. Div. 2002). 
 218 See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1130, 1135 (Miss. 
2002). 
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Unjust consequences will follow New York’s refusal to 
expand the tort for third-party spoliation. Absent a third-party 
spoliation tort, the integrity of New York’s judicial system 
could be jeopardized.219 When evidence helpful to one party is 
absent, courts cannot administer even-handed justice.220 
Recognizing a tort for third-party spoliation would reduce 
spoliation by putting businesses, governmental entities, and 
individuals on notice that if they destroy evidence, serious 
consequences could result.221 This effect would promote “an 
individual’s due process right to have one’s grievances heard by 
a court of competent jurisdiction utilizing all relevant 
evidence.”222 When squarely presented with this issue, New 
York courts would be wise to give serious consideration to the 
reasoning of jurisdictions that have recognized a tort for third-
party spoliation. To do otherwise risks inviting destruction of 
relevant evidence by third parties and the perception that 
“individual due process rights are unimportant or are somehow 
being trampled by the judicial system itself.”223 
 
James T. Killelea† 
 
 219 See Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1997). 
 220 Id. (stating that spoliation “creates enormous costs for both the victimized 
party and the judicial system, prevents fair and proper adjudication of the issues, and 
interferes with the administration of justice.”). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. (citing Spencer, supra note 4, at 63). 
 223 Id. at 1018. 
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